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ABSTRACT
This essay analyses how the relation between food and fuel shapes the practice
of collaborative food governance. Dominant explanations for the persistence of
global hunger often point to the influence of political-economic inequalities on
the production, distribution, and governance of global food. The causes of the
2007–2008 global food crisis, however, suggest the need to examine the
entanglements between food and other forms of ecological extraction. I draw
on the concept of ‘energopolitics’ to demonstrate how changing material
processes of energy extraction condition the calculative logics through which
transnational food governance is constituted. An energopolitical analysis, I
argue, illuminates how collaborative food governance supresses the conflict
between food and fuel that it was developed to mediate. In an era of climate
change, such an approach reveals the links between food and broader
struggles over carbon-fuelled inequalities.
KEYWORDS Food governance; biofuels; energy; political economy; political ecology
The 2007–2008 global food crisis was a powerful reminder of the critical role
that food production and provisioning play in constituting transnational nor-
mative orders. Just as ending global hunger, orwhat is now called ‘food security’,
played an important role in the formation of the post-World War II inter-
national order, recent food crises have served as contentious conflicts that
have challenged hegemonic regulatory regimes. The 2007–2008 global food
crisis was one such moment of transformation. The regulatory failure pushed
100 million more people into hunger and caused food riots in over thirty
countries.1 As states, transnational social movements, corporations, and inter-
national institutions struggled for control, a new paradigm of collaborative
transnational food security governance emerged. Today, the practice of colla-
borative food governance offers a critical site throughwhich to analyse changing
forms of power amidst a shifting political economic and ecological context.
© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
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1 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, & World Food Program, The State of Food Inse-
curity in the World 2009, (FAO 2009), online: <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i0876e.pdf>; Raj Patel and Philip
McMichael, ‘A Political Economy of the Food Riot’ (2009) 32 Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 9–35.
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Most accounts of food security politics point to political-economic asym-
metries as the driving factor shaping the production, distribution, and govern-
ance of global food. These asymmetries were particularly manifest in the
negotiation of the Agreement on Agriculture and other global trade agree-
ments, which have perpetuated hunger among small-scale producers and
rural peoples in the developing world.2 The inclusion of civil society and
other actors into new arenas and global decision-making processes thus
offered hope of democratizing global food governance. Yet though multi-sta-
keholder and collaborative arenas of global food governance have been
designed to offer a more level playing field, inequalities persist. Analysts of
global food security governance are thus becoming increasingly disillusioned
with collaborative and multi-stakeholder paradigms of governance.3 Such fail-
ures to produce more equitable outcomes even through collaborative models
suggests the need to look beyond ‘capitalocentric’ political economic accounts
of power within transnational governance processes.
Indeed, the causes of the 2007–2008 global food crisis, point to a set of eco-
logical entanglements overlooked by political economic accounts. While
several factors converged to cause the crises, concern over energy was a key
factor; rising oil prices and concurrent increased biofuel demand were
major causes of the global food crisis.4 As crops whose starches, sugars,
oils, and cellulose can be harvested to produce carbon energy, biofuels have
been pursued with an increasing zeal by powerful states seeking to wean
themselves from fossil fuels while maintaining their national energy security.
As states replaced food crops with fuel crops, however, they limited global
food stocks, causing food prices to skyrocket.5 The crisis thus revealed the sig-
nificance of the ‘food-fuel nexus’—a mutually dependent relationship that had
also been at the centre of the 1973–1974 global food crisis. The causal role of
2 Carmen G Gonzalez, ‘Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Food Security,
and Developing Countries’ (2002) 27 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 433; Jennifer Clapp,
‘World Hunger And The Global Economy: Strong Linkages, Weak Action’ (2014) 67 Journal of Inter-
national Affairs 1.
3 Nora McKeon, ‘Are Equity and Sustainability a Likely Outcome When Foxes and Chickens Share the Same
Coop? Critiquing the Concept of Multistakeholder Governance of Food Security’ (2017) 14:3 Globaliza-
tions 379.
4 Those concerned with the interactions between food and fuel often prefer the term ‘agrofuels,’ over ‘bio-
fuels.’ The term ‘biofuels’ is promoted by powerful states, transnational agri-business corporations, and
other associated interest groups in an effort to frame the production of fuel crops as a sustainable
alternative to fossil-fuels. Those who use the term ‘agrofuels’ seek to emphasize the political drivers
of land use change and the resulting impact on economic inequality and food insecurity. As Deitz
and others note, “the term agrofuels alludes to agro-industrial agriculture and its inherent commodifica-
tion of nature and to the modernization and industrialization of rural areas with all impact on social
relations and ecological conditions.” See Kristina Dietz and others, The Political Ecology of Biofuels (Rou-
tledge, 2014) 3. While I prefer the term ‘agrofuels’, I use the term ‘biofuels’ throughout this article for
consistency, since it served as the dominant framing of the negotiation within the Committee on
World Food Security, which I analyse later in this article.
5 Mark W Rosegrant. (International Food Policy Research Institute), Biofuels and Grain Prices: Impacts and
Policy Responses (2008), online: <http://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/10350/
filename/10351.pdf>.
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the food-fuel nexus in both crises therefore suggest that while political econ-
omic inequalities certainly play a key role in transnational food governance,
understanding the contemporary operation and exercise of power requires
attending to the energetic foundations of power.
This brief article reassesses how competition over energy shapes trans-
national food security governance. Building on recent studies that have
located energy, rather than capital, at the core of global relations of
power, this article proposes that the recognition of the food-fuel nexus
necessitates a new conceptual framework to assess the power exercised
both within global food governance and across transnational legal pro-
cesses. In analysing the production and practice of transnational food
security governance, I draw on the concept of ‘energopower’—the power
generated and exercised ‘over and through energy.’6 In applying this frame-
work to analyse transnational food security governance, I suggest that the
development and practice of collaborative governance serves to maintain
carbon-fuelled inequalities as food and fuel increasingly compete over
land. By assuming that this conflict can be resolved through consensus,
without recognising energy-driven power asymmetries, multi-stakeholder
processes supress the conflict they have been deployed to mediate. In an
era when climate change threatens humanity’s survival, an energopolitical
lens thus connects conflicts over food and agriculture with broader
struggles over ecological extraction.
Part I offers a short history of the rise of transnational food security gov-
ernance, emphasising the often-overlooked role of the food-fuel nexus. I
describe how the biofuel-caused food crisis of 2007–2008 led to a transform-
ation of the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) from an intergo-
vernmental institution to a collaborative, multi-stakeholder arena. In Part II, I
draw on ethnographic fieldwork within the CFS to analyse the negotiation of
the Recommendations on Biofuels and Food Security. I describe how unequal
power relations throughout the process profoundly shaped the outcomes of
the negotiations. While most accounts suggest that such a failure of collabor-
ation is the product of inadequately designed processes to account for asym-
metries of bargaining power (which are themselves considered a reflection of
inequalities of capital), in Part III, I offer an alternative account, focusing on
the role of energopower. In this section, I develop a thumbnail sketch of the
way that the food-fuel nexus has historically shaped shifting ideologies of
transnational regulation. I suggest that collaborative governance has arisen
in response to the failure of previous calculative logics of energy within trans-
national legal arrangements, but like previous regulatory ideologies seeks to
depoliticise the food-fuel nexus in order to maintain dominant distributions
of power. Ultimately, through this energopolitical analysis of global food
6 Dominic Boyer, ‘Energopower: An Introduction’ (2014) 87:2 Anthropological Quarterly 309, 323.
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governance, this article contributes to this Symposium by situating the study
of transnational food governance within broader struggles over ecological
extraction in an age of climate change.
I. The rise of transnational food security governance
Contemporary transnational food security governance has its roots in the world
food crisis of 1972–1974. The crisis’ immediate cause was a large global grain
trade, a détente, between the Soviet Union and the United States (US) after
the Soviet Union faced a massive crop failure. The trade created a sudden short-
age on global grain markets that caused cereal prices to skyrocket.7 Yet under-
lying the crisis was an oil shock that caused the US, then the world’s main
guarantor of global food security, significant anxiety. Since the development
of ‘scientific farming’ in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, indus-
trial food production had become dependent on cheap and easy access to fuel
for agricultural inputs such as fertiliser and pesticides as well as for transport.8
The US also actively promoted these fossil-fuel dependent forms of agro-indus-
trial production in Latin America and South Asia through the Green Revolu-
tion. The crisis illuminated the mutual dependence of states on food and fuel
and immediately produced a political struggle over global food regulation.
Standing before the UN General Assembly in 1974, US President Gerald
Ford made the link between food and energy clear, when he declared:
The food and oil crises demonstrate the extent of our interdependence…
Energy is required to produce food and food to produce energy—and both
to provide a decent life for everyone. A global strategy for food and energy is
urgently required.9
In the aftermath of the crisis, participants in the 1974 World Food Summit
agreed to form the World Food Council (WFC) to coordinate the UN’s
response to the global food crisis as well as a standing FAO Committee on
World Food Security. Soon after the crisis, however, to cope with both
increasing global competition and the ongoing threat of energy insecurity,
the US embraced a more market-oriented approach to relieve its agricultural
surpluses. It sought to limit the WFC’s mandate and, along with other OECD
countries, to dismantle the UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO)
authorities, reorganising them to allow for greater control and oversight by
donor countries.10 Rather than building an international architecture to
monitor global food stocks and manage global food markets, the US and
7 Harriet Friedmann, ‘The Political Economy of Food: A Global Crisis’ (1993) New Left Review 29.
8 Deborah Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture (Yale University
Press, 2010).




other grain exporting countries became increasingly focused on trade. Inter-
national finance institutions and the Global Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade
became the primary arenas driving global food governance. By 1995, the
Washington Consensus emerged as the dominant economic ideology and
the Agreement on Agriculture was signed, unevenly opening up formerly pro-
tected agricultural markets.
The penetration of neoliberalism in global food and agriculture may have
helped to manage the contradictions of the US-dominated global ‘food
regime’ of the post-World War II period, but it did not address concerns
about energy security.11 In the 1970s, the mutually dependent relationship
between food and fuel grew increasingly contradictory. In response to
efforts by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) to
take greater control over their natural resources, powerful oil dependent
states began to turn to biofuels as a fuel additive and source of transport
fuel. As concerns about foreign energy dependence, ‘peak oil’, and fossil
fuel-caused climate change grew increasingly salient, the US, Canada, the
European Union, Brazil and other countries began to implement biofuel man-
dates and subsidies to stimulate a market for renewable fuels.12 By the early
2000s, the global biofuel market had rapidly expanded and US imports
tripled.13 Ethanol output grew from 16.9 to 72.0 billion litres and biodiesel
output grew from 0.8 to 14.7 billion litres.14 In 2008 alone, 16% of the
world’s soy crop, 18% of the world’s sugar cane, and 11% of the world’s
corn harvest went into biofuel production.15 Consequently, food and fuel
crops were in direct competition for land.
In the aftermath of the biofuel-caused food crisis 2007–2008, multiple
actors and institutions began to vie for authority over food and agricultural
governance. In the meantime, a powerful set of transnational agrarian
10 Nora McKeon, Food Security Governance: Empowering Communities, Regulating Corporations (Routledge,
2015) 16.
11 Harriet Friedmann and Philip McMichael describe ‘food regimes’ as ‘rule-governed structure[s] of pro-
duction and consumption of food on a world scale.’ They identify three food regimes: the colonial food
regime dominated by the United Kingdom (1870–1930s), a ‘mercantile industrial’ food regime domi-
nated by the United States (1940s–1970s), and a third regime starting in the 1970s that has sometimes
been called the ‘corporate food regime’ or the ‘corporate-environmental regime.’ The food regime fra-
mework reveals how internal contradictions and struggles for control within each regime has facilitated
shifting arrangements of global agricultural power. See Philip McMichael, ‘A Food Regime Genealogy’
(2009) 36:1 The Journal of Peasant Studies 139; Harriet Friedmann, ‘From Colonialism to Green Capital-
ism: Social Movements and Emergence of Food Regimes’ (2015) 11 New Directions in the Sociology of
Global Development 227.
12 For an empirical analysis of biofuel mandates see: Timothy Wise and Emily Cole, ‘Global Development
and Environment Institute, Mandating Food Insecurity: The Global Impacts of Rising Biofuel Mandates
and Targets’ (2015), GDAE Working Paper No. 15-01.
13 See Gustavo de LT Oliveira, Ben McKay and Christina Plank, ‘How Biofuel Policies Backfire: Misguided
Goals, Inefficient Mechanisms, and Political-Ecological Blind Spots’ (2017) 108 Energy Policy 765.
14 Giovanni Sorda, Martin Banse and Claudia Kemfert, ‘An Overview of Biofuel Policies across the World’
(2010) 38 Energy Policy 6977, 6977.
15 Robert Bailis and Jennifer Baka, ‘Constructing Sustainable Biofuels: Governance of the Emerging Biofuel
Economy’ (2011) 101:4 Annals of the Association of American Geographers 827, 830.
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movements had formed to oppose neoliberalism in agriculture. These move-
ments, along with a cadre of international NGOs, began to demand inclusion
into decision-making processes. They argued that the FAO and the CFS, the
institution in which they had had the greatest access, were the most appropri-
ate arenas for global food governance. With the FAO’s authority waning, it
initiated a reform process that would lead the CFS to become themost inclus-
ive global food security policy space, in an attempt to subsume competing
initiatives.16
Although participants of the CFS approached the reform process with
very different visions of ‘inclusivity’, multi-stakeholder partnerships
offered a popular template for governance. Multi-stakeholder initiatives
emerged in the 1990s in response to both neoliberal challenges to the hier-
archical ‘command and control’ paradigm of regulation as well as demands
for participation from below, particularly in the domain of environmental
politics.17 Grounded in a pragmatic and collaborative approach to
problem-solving, multi-stakeholder initiatives are based on the primary
assumption that ‘more participation and deliberation by affected groups
will generate more effective collective problem-solving.’18 Proponents of col-
laborative governance suggest that non-hierarchical, deliberative, and con-
sensus-based processes can produce ‘win-win’ solutions for global conflicts.
In the context of struggles between food and fuel, collaborative forms of
governance suggested a compromise could be reached between competing
demands and social values. Hence, in response to the biofuel-caused food
crisis, the CFS adopted a complex hybrid structure that draws together inter-
governmental decision-making, multi-actor negotiation, and expert gui-
dance. At the same time, different institutional arrangements of
collaborative governance proliferated to manage a variety of crop-specific
conflicts over biofuels, including the Roundtable on Responsible Palm Oil,
Bonsucro (formerly the Better Sugarcane Initiative), the Roundtable on
Responsible Soy, and the Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials. By
drawing on the symbols of participation, inclusion, and consensus, the
emerging multi-stakeholder paradigm seemed to offer the promise of
greater global democracy.19
16 See Christoffersen, Leif E. and others, Food and Agricultural Organization, FAO: The Challenge of Renewal:
Report of the Independent External Evaluation of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO), (2007), online: <http://www.fao.org/unfao/bodies/IEE-Working-Draft-Report/K0489E.
pdf>.
17 The language of ‘stakeholders’ however itself emerged from management strategy. See R Edward
Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
18 Karin Bäckstrand, ‘Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Rethinking Legitimacy,
Accountability and Effectiveness’ (2006) 16 European Environment 290, 295.
19 As McKeon notes, ‘It is in this democratic ‘public sphere’ that the tendencies represented by the
reformed CFS can be situated and—hopefully—reinforced by extending their authority over the econ-
omic world.’ McKeon (n 10) 202.
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II. The practice of collaborative food governance
Biofuels were one of the key issues that the CFS sought to address in its
reform. However, they proved deeply controversial.20 In 2011, when the
CFS negotiated a set of recommendations to address food price volatility,
civil society walked out because the US and other biofuel producers refused
to recognise the impact of biofuels on rising food prices. Two years later, at
the fortieth session of the CFS in 2013, the Committee met to develop a set
of Policy Recommendations on Biofuels and Food Security (Recommen-
dations), which I observed as part of a multi-year ethnographic project on
the CFS.
In the preparatory meetings of the Civil Society Mechanism—the auton-
omous platform for the coordination of peoples’ organisations, social move-
ments, and international NGOs—activists expected the negotiations to be
tense. However, because the CFS’ mandate is focused on the elimination of
hunger and the progressive realisation of the right to food, they hoped to
develop a strong statement that prioritised food security over energy extrac-
tion and markets. Some participants described the negotiations over the Rec-
ommendations as a ‘test’ for the CFS—an evaluation of the possibility of
multi-stakeholder, collaborative processes to engage in the reasoned, non-
hierarchical negotiation in the context of contentious issues related to food
security.
The process for developing guidelines and recommendations in the CFS is
multi-faceted. All documents, however, are negotiated in face-to-face meet-
ings through ‘Friends of the Chair’ sessions during the annual, weeklong
meetings of the CFS.21 At CFS 40, the Chair of the CFS (Chair) selected a del-
egate from Bangladesh to serve as the rapporteur or facilitator of the nego-
tiations, which were supposed to be completed over three days’ time.
Conflict erupted almost as soon as the negotiations began. For twenty
minutes, civil society and powerful biofuel producing states debated just the
adjective that should define the link between energy and food security.
Closely linked? Maybe linked? Should it be ‘energy security and food
20 Biofuels are also controversial because they are not energy efficient. In fact, it is highly debated whether
biofuels are more sustainable than other fuel sources. Research suggests that there may somewhere
between a net zero and twenty percent net gain in energy efficiency from biofuels. Biofuels promoters
suggest that ‘second‘ and ‘third-generation’ biofuels can promote a more sustainable future, they
depend on technologies that do not yet exist at commercial scales. Moreover, biofuels are a subsidised
industry that is increasingly consolidated and unevenly distributed. Fred Magdoff, ‘The Political
Economy and Ecology of Biofuels’ (2008) 60 Monthly Review 34; The High Level Panel of Experts on
Food Security and Nutrition, Biofuels and Food Security: A report by the High Level Panel of Experts
on Food Security and Nutrition of the Committee on World Food Security, (2013), UN Committee on
World Food Security, online: <http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/hlpe/hlpe_documents/
HLPE_Reports/HLPE-Report-5_Biofuels_and_food_security.pdf>, 93.
21 CFS 40 took place in from 7–11 October 2013. For an overview of the process as well as the history of
civil society engagement, see: John L Comaroff and Simon Roberts, Rules and Processes (University of
Chicago Press 1986).
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security’? Energy policy? The debate over the word that should define the link
between food security and energy security lay at the very core of the conflict. It
became immediately clear that major biofuel producing nations—Canada, the
US, Brazil, and Australia—were steadfast in promoting their own biofuel
industries. While they agreed to recognise the potential harmful conse-
quences, they also sought to ensure that the text encouraged biofuels as a
potential form of renewable energy and economic development. Activists
sought to continually remind participants of the CFS’ mandate and that
any recommendations should be grounded in the prior commitments of sta-
keholders to protect food security.
Halfway through the first page, negotiations started to break down over a
sentence that underscored ‘that food security and the progressive realisation
of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security should
be priority concerns for all the relevant stakeholders in biofuel develop-
ment.’22 Civil society wished to include the names of already agreed upon
human rights frameworks and guidelines that would inform this priority.
In response to civil society member’s push to include the right to food, the
Canadian delegate stated, ‘the right to food is not an agreed and established
right in the same way as an international declaration.’ Though the
comment was surprising since the right to food lies at the very core of the
CFS’ mandate, it reflected the intensity of the dispute.
As time when on, the rapporteur of the negotiations increasingly began to
recognise that biofuel promoting states would not compromise. He started to
chasten developing countries and civil society when they continued to ques-
tion the benefits of biofuels. When one African country sought to exert the
same ‘veto power’ that powerful northern countries had been exercising
throughout the negotiations, the rapporteur said that he thought that the
country ‘should be convinced.’23 At another point he told civil society
groups to come up with a more ‘compromising attitude.’ Consensus
became a discourse that was coercively applied to less powerful countries
and civil society.
Although space does not allow a thick ethnographic description of the
negotiation, members of civil society were disappointed with the final
product. They read a strongly worded statement in the Plenary, explaining
that the negotiations ‘failed to reflect the views of countries whose right to
food is affected by biofuels policies’ and argued that, ‘the text overwhelmingly
reflect[ed] the opinion of countries defending the interests of their own bio-
fuels industry.’ The Chair of the CFS responded by asking what he should do
with this statement. ‘How can we move forward without consensus?’ he asked.
22 Zero draft version of the Policy Roundtable on Biofuels and Food Security. UN Committee on World
Food Security. Copy on file with author. 8–10 October 2013.
23 All quotes are drawn from the author’s fieldnotes of observations of the negotiations of the Recommen-
dations on Biofuels and Food Security at CFS 40 in Rome, Italy.
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According to the formal rules of the CFS, only states need to vote on final
standards. Yet the CFS often operates as if all stakeholders are part of the con-
sensus. Civil society’s rejection of the biofuels thus unsettled this conceit. In
response, a long-time civil society participant stated that it was civil society’s
right to withdraw from the consensus, but that they would continue to partici-
pate in the CFS processes. The Chair looked relieved and responded that he
was happy that civil society was not going to try to ‘block’ the process and
allow it to move forward.
In analysing this negotiation, one might point to the informal rules by
which powerful actors exercised power. Indeed, anthropologists have long
deployed ethnographic analyses of legal processes to excavate the implicit
rules and forms of power that structure legal processes.24 Certainly, both
scholars and participants of deliberative processes have laboured to emphasise
how such process inequalities shape unequal outcomes.25 Multiple other ana-
lyses of multi-stakeholder negotiations in the CFS and other arenas of trans-
national biofuel governance also have found that their participatory
procedures often fail to be as authentically ‘inclusive’ and non-hierarchical
as they claim.26 Such analyses thus prescribe a ‘thickening’ of deliberative pro-
cesses to render them more democratic.27 Yet by focusing on political-econ-
omic power as the primary driver of political interests, such analyses may
overlook the ecological entanglements that constitute power relations.
Given the proliferation of collaborative mechanisms to manage conflicts
between food and fuel, a new understanding of power within transnational
food security governance is needed. In the final section, therefore, I introduce
the concepts of ‘energopolitics’ and ‘energopower’ and suggest their utility for
24 See, for example: Comaroff and Roberts, Rules and Processes (University of Chicago Press 1986).
25 Taehyon Choi and Peter J Robertson, ‘Deliberation and Decision in Collaborative Governance: A Simu-
lation of Approaches to Mitigate Power Imbalance’ (2014) 24 Journal of Public Administration Research
and Theory 495; Jill M Purdy, ‘The Role of Power in Collaborative Governance’ in Richard D Margerum
and Cathy J Robinson (eds), The Challenges of Collaboration in Environmental Governance: Barriers and
Responses (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016).
26 For a recent view of the CFS, see: Nora McKeon, ‘Are Equity and Sustainability a Likely Outcome When
Foxes and Chickens Share the Same Coop? Critiquing the Concept of Multistakeholder Governance of
Food Security’ (2017) 14:3 Globalizations 379. For critical appraisals of biofuel governance, see: Theresa
Selfa, Carmen Bain and Renata Moreno, ‘Depoliticizing Land and Water “Grabs” in Colombia: The Limits
of Bonsucro Certification for Enhancing Sustainable Biofuel Practices’ (2014) 31 Agriculture and Human
Values 455; Michiel Köhne, ‘Multi-Stakeholder Initiative Governance as Assemblage: Roundtable on Sus-
tainable Palm Oil as a Political Resource in Land Conflicts Related to Oil Palm Plantations’ (2014) 31
Agriculture and Human Values 469; Greetje Schouten, Pieter Leroy and Pieter Glasbergen, ‘On the Delib-
erative Capacity of Private Multi-Stakeholder Governance: The Roundtables on Responsible Soy and
Sustainable Palm Oil’ (2012) 83 Ecological Economics 42; Emmanuelle Cheyns, ‘Multi-Stakeholder Initiat-
ives for Sustainable Agriculture: Limits of the “Inclusiveness” Paradigm’ in Stefano Ponte, Jakob Vester-
gaard and Peter Gibbon (eds), Governing Through Standards: Origins, Drivers and Limitations (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2011). More broadly, for a more general critique of multi-stakeholder processes, see: Harris
Gleckman, Transnational Institute, Multi-Stakeholderism: A Corporate Push for a New Form of Global Gov-
ernance (2016), online: <https://www.tni.org/en/publication/multi-stakeholderism-a-corporate-push-
for-a-new-form-of-global-governance>.
27 For a description of ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ proceduralism see: Julia Black, ‘Proceduralizing Regulation: Part II’
(2001) 21:1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33.
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understanding transformations in transnational food security governance and
transnational law, more broadly.
III. Energopolitics and the food-fuel nexus
In an era when humans are facing the ecological constraints of climate change,
critical scholars have begun to re-evaluate dominant accounts of power and
capitalist development by highlighting the under-acknowledged role of
nature in enabling processes of accumulation.28 This move is part of a
broader shift within the social sciences and humanities to recognise the eco-
logical foundations of inequality in the age of the ‘Anthropocene’—the geo-
logical epoch recently named to recognise that human activity is the
primary driver of environmental transformation. Energy is at the core of
these analyses. As the capacity to work, energy is crucial for labour and the
production of value. Yet humans cannot produce energy on their own. As
Alfred Crosby puts it, we are all ‘children of the sun’ that rely on plants or
technologies to convert solar energy into usable carbon energy.29 Competition
for carbon energy has thus served as the basis for capital accumulation and
larger global political economies. Seen through an energy-focused lens, Tim
di Muzio summarises that ‘the global political economy is at base a solar
economy whereby humans have come to monetise energy and natural
resources in hierarchical domestic and international relationships.’30 Scholars
frommultiple disciplines are thus beginning to reassess the constitutive role of
energy in politics, law, and the economy.31
Recent studies have primarily focused on fossil fuels, but agriculture has
been central throughout the longue duree of energy extraction and consump-
tion. Before fossil fuels, biomass served as the primary form of fuel that
powered human civilisation. In these mostly agrarian societies, control over
agricultural surpluses created the material foundation for different relation-
ships of power.32 The development of technologies that could take advantage
28 Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘The Climate of History: Four Theses’ (2009) 35 Critical Inquiry 197. Jason Moore
describes this as a ‘world ecological’ approach that integrates the political economic lens of world
systems theory with political ecological analyses of planetary extraction. Jason W Moore, Capitalism
in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital (Verso, 2015).
29 Alfred W Crosby, Children of the Sun: A History of Humanity’s Unappeasable Appetite for Energy (W W
Norton & Company, 2007).
30 Tim Di Muzio, ‘Energy, Capital as Power and World Order’ in The Palgrave Handbook of Critical Inter-
national Political Economy (Springer, 2016) 267.
31 Tim Di Muzio, Carbon Capitalism: Energy, Social Reproduction and World Order (Rowman & Littlefield
International, 2015); Andreas Malm, Fossil Capital: The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of Global
Warming (Verso Books, 2016); Hannah Appel, Arthur Mason and Michael Watts, Subterranean Estates:
Life Worlds of Oil and Gas (Cornell University Press, 2015); Laura Nader, The Energy Reader (John
Wiley & Sons, 2010).
32 Michael W Young, Fighting With Food: Leadership, Values and Social Control in a Massim Society (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2009). See also: Jane Fajans, ‘The Transformative Value of Food: A Review Essay’
(1988) 3 Food and Foodways 143.
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of the ‘buried sunshine’ of carbon-dense fossil fuels transformed Western
European agrarian societies and spurred colonial schemes to secure food
for industrialising states, causing massive transformations in the geography
of global food production.33 The industrialisation of agriculture through
fossil fuel-based inputs and fuel-run machinery in the Global North deepened
the relationship between food and fuel. It was not until after the 1972–1973
global food and fuel crises, however, that powerful states recognised the econ-
omic and political vulnerability caused by the ‘food-fuel nexus’.34
The function of agriculture as a source of human energy and, increasingly,
as transport fuel suggests that disputes over global food are substantively
changing how powerful states assess the relation between food and fuel.
Though political-economic accounts of power—whether in agrarian studies
or those deployed in collaborative governance scholarship—emphasise the
competition for capital accumulation, they often overlook the way that the
material processes of extraction shape the calculative logics upon which regu-
lation is constructed.35 In effort to remedy this, Dominic Boyer developed the
concepts of ‘energopolitics’ and ‘energopower’. In developing these concepts,
Boyer draws on the Foucauldian notion of biopolitics, which emphasises ‘the
specific strategies and contestations over problematizations of collective
human vitality, morbidity and mortality,’36 but he challenges the human-
centric understandings of power and knowledge inherent in the Foucault’s
analysis.37 He defines energopolitics as ‘a genealogy of modern power that
rethinks political power through the twin analytics of electricity and fuel.’38
Such an intervention seeks to ‘make energy a crucial part of the story of the
formation of the modern subject and the constitution of the contemporary
state.’39
Studies of energopolitics emphasise how socio-technical arrangements of
energy extraction, production, processing, and consumption constitute con-
tingent assemblages of political authority and expertise.40 In doing so, they
reveal how energy has shaped national and global regulatory ideologies. For
example, Timothy Mitchell has analysed how oil shaped the calculative
33 Crosby (n 29).
34 Robert Bailey, ‘The “Food Versus Fuel” Nexus’ in Andreas Goldthau (ed), The Handbook of Global Energy
Policy (John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2013).
35 In agrarian studies, see, for example: Henry Bernstein, Class Dynamics of Agrarian Change (Kumarian
Press 2010); For collaborative governances scholarship see: Choi and Robertson (n 26); Purdy (n 26).
36 Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, ‘Biopower Today’ (2006) 1 BioSocieties 195, 197.
37 Boyer (n 6).
38 Boyer, ‘Energopower: An Introduction’ (n 6) 325. See also Dominic Boyer, ‘Energopolitics and the
Anthropology of Energy’ (2011) 52 Anthropology News 5, 5.
39 Imre Szeman, ‘Conclusion: On Energopolitics’ (2014) 87 Anthropological Quarterly 453, 459.
40 See, for example: Douglas Rogers, ‘The Materiality of the Corporation: Oil, Gas, and Corporate Social
Technologies in the Remaking of a Russian Region’ (2012) 39 American Ethnologist 284; Catherine Alex-
ander and Joshua O Reno, ‘From Biopower to Energopolitics in England’s Modern Waste Technology’
(2014) 87 Anthropological Quarterly 335; Jennifer Richter, ‘Energopolitics and Nuclear Waste: Containing
the Threat of Radioactivity’ (2017) 30 Energy Research & Social Science 61.
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logics of the post-war Keynesian welfare state. As he explains, the availability
of seemingly endless amounts of oil enabled post-war economic theorists such
as Keynes to bracket natural resources and flows of energy, which had pre-
viously thought to have been finite and instead build a modern science of
economics based on money and prices.41 Mitchell argues that these calculative
logics enabled the ‘economy’ to emerge as an independent sphere of expert
knowledge and management, thereby facilitating the rise of the US regulatory
state. While the materiality of oil—its abundance, location, and ease of trans-
port—helped shape the forms of knowledge that allowed for administrative
control, food also played a key role.42 Fossil fuel-based inputs provided the
agricultural surpluses that were used by the US as a tool of peace (and
warfare).
Together, the food-fuel nexus of the mid-twentieth century helped to form
what Wolfgang Friedman called the ‘international law of cooperation’.43 The
post-war order was envisioned as a global economy regulated by institutions
modelled in the image of the Keynesian welfare state—premised on national
economic development, import-substitution industrialisation, and agricul-
tural protection.44 The formation of transnational food and agricultural insti-
tutions thus helped to inscribe the Keynesian-Fordist development project
into the post-war international order.
Yet as early as the 1950s, struggles to maintain control over oil foresha-
dowed a normative set of transformations that would become more dominant
in later decades. During this period, Philip Jessup observed what he described
as ‘transnational law,’ a new form of legality that combined public and private
law and incorporated both states and non-states.45 Jessup’s use of examples
from agreements and arbitrations between nation-states and multi-national
oil corporations to analyse this new legal form is often overlooked. In the
bid to secure their oil resources British and American states elevated multina-
tional oil corporations’ status into an almost quasi-state, embracing an ‘inter-
national law of contract’ in which states and corporations were aligned as
41 Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (Verso Books, 2011); Christophe
Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene: The Earth, History and Us
(Reprint edition, Verso, 2017).
42 Mitchell notes the important role of agriculture, explaining, ‘We think of industrialization (and the
democracy that followed) as an urban phenomenon based on fossil fuels, but it depended on an agrar-
ian and colonial transformation based on organic forms of energy’. Mitchell (n 41) 16.
43 Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (Columbia University Press, 1964).
44 As Anne-Marie Slaughter explains, in its early formation, Roosevelt hoped to design the Food and Agri-
culture Organization (FAO) in the model of a US regulatory agency. She writes, ‘In 1943, Roosevelt envi-
sioned the conferences of the Food and Agriculture Organization as prototypes for a series of
permanent international agencies in social and economic fields’. Anne-Marie Burley-Slaughter, ‘Regu-
lating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory
State’ in Robert Howse (ed), The World Trading System: Critical Perspectives on the World Economy (Rou-
tledge, 1998); See also, Amy LS Staples and Amy L Sayward, The Birth of Development: How the World
Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945–1965
(Kent State University Press, 2006).
45 Philip Jessup, Transnational Law (Yale University Press, 1956).
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equal private actors.46 When the world faced oil and food crises in the 1970s,
the ‘transnational situations’ observed by Jessup became increasingly com-
monplace as concern over oil propelled the ascendance of neoliberalism.
Indeed, the oil shocks were used by neoliberal economists as evidence for
what they argued was the failure of Keynesian regulation.47 Both Keynesian-
ism and neoliberalism were thus shaped by energopolitics; Just as Keynesian
ideology was enabled by the calculative logics of abundant energy, neoliberal
theory attempted to externalise the increasingly recognised scarcity of energy
through the price system. Beginning in the late 1970s and 1980s, this led to a
more market-oriented, and corporate consolidated system of global food pro-
duction and provisioning.
By the 2000s, the food-fuel nexus facilitated yet another set of normative
transformations. The increasing demand for biofuels and the pressures this
put on agricultural land, especially through land grabs, caused a global food
crisis that revealed a fundamental conflict between food and fuel.48 To
mediate this conflict, collaborative and multi-stakeholder models emerged
as a new common-sense for transnational food and environmental govern-
ance.49 By including civil society and social movements, this participatory
paradigm created the possibility of democratising the governance of global
food. In fact, collaborative multi-stakeholder models of governance have
become most widespread in fields related to energy: food, agriculture, and
mining.50 Yet collaboration, is not restricted to environmental conflicts. In
response to the failure of neoliberal forms of coordination, Annelise Riles
suggests that collaboration has become increasingly a ‘template for social
and political life, as well as market activity.’51
While scholars have described the organisational diffusion of multi-stake-
holder models as an expression of the politics of sustainability,52 they can also
46 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University
Press, 2007) 229–34.
47 The development of the field of resource economics, played an important role in defeating Keynesian
economics by developing new market mechanisms including an oil futures market on the New York
Mercantile Exchange and carbon markets that could serve to coordinate the petro-economy. See
Timothy Mitchell, ‘The Resources of Economics’ (2010) 3:2 Journal of Cultural Economy 189. In addition,
Sandy Smith-Nonini traces the ways in which the oil crisis and the petrodollars that were generated
from it enabled neoliberalism to emerge. Sandy Smith-Nonini, ‘The Role of Corporate Oil and Energy
Debt in Creating the Neoliberal Era’ (2016) 3 Economic Anthropology 57.
48 Philip McMichael, ‘Biofuels in the Food Regime’ (2010) 37:4 The Journal of Peasant Studies 609; Marc
Edelman, Carlos Oya and Saturnino M Borras JR, ‘Global Land Grabs: Historical Processes, Theoretical
and Methodological Implications and Current Trajectories’ (2013) 34:9 Third World Quarterly 1517.
49 Neil Gunningham, ‘The New Collaborative Environmental Governance: The Localization of Regulation’
(2009) 36:1 Journal of Law and Society 145.
50 MSI Integrity and Duke Human Rights Center at the Kenan Institute for Ethics, The New Regulators?
Assessing the Landscape of Multi-Stakeholder Initiative (2017), online: <https://msi-database.org/
data/The%20New%20Regulators%20-%20MSI%20Database%20Report.pdf>.
51 Annelise Riles, ‘From Comparison to Collaboration: Experiments with a New Scholarly and Political
Reform’ (2015) 78 Law and Contemporary Problems 147, 153.
52 Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg, ‘World Politics and Organizational Fields: The Case of Transna-
tional Sustainability Governance’ (2009) 15:4 European Journal of International Relations 707.
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be understood as a product of energopolitics. For the multi-stakeholderisation
of the food-fuel nexus represents an effort to re-internalise planetary limits
back into socio-economic forms of regulation that were once excised in Key-
nesian and neoliberal regulatory forms of regulation. However, through the
multi-stakeholder model, food and fuel are constructed as a set of equivalents
that assumes a consensus can be reached between these two goods. By re-
internalising the environmental limits through the bargaining model of
multi-stakeholder governance, the contradiction between food and fuel is
diffused and the relation between them is reconstructed as complementary.
An energopolitical account of collaborative governance thus reveals how
material processes of energy extraction and consumption shape how contesta-
tion related to the food-fuel nexus is constituted. In this context, energopower
operates through both construction of its subjects and as a process of dispute
management. First, multi-stakeholder governance constructs ‘stakeholders’ as
formally equal parties to a conflict. Rather than recognising the historically-
shaped hierarchies and differentiated responsibilities that have resulted
from uneven energy consumption and emissions, collaborative arrangements
seek to transcend inequalities between stakeholders through ‘authentic’ and
‘inclusive’ dialogue. However, the biofuel negotiation described above unset-
tles this conceit. This was clear from the rapporteur’s efforts to coerce less
powerful countries and civil society actors into being ‘more compromising.’
Yet only certain actors needed to adopt a more compromising attitude, illu-
minating the implicit hierarchies of power underlying the multi-stakeholder
process.
Second, multi-stakeholder processes reconstitute deeply political conflicts
over energy-fuelled inequalities as technocratic problems that can be solved
through consensus-based solutions. Throughout the negotiations, the rappor-
teur constantly echoed the refrain that ‘we need to get to consensus’ in
attempt to diffuse antagonism between stakeholders. This techno-managerial
approach to mediating conflict has thus been described as ‘post-political.’53
The post-political frame emphasises the contradiction that while climate
change, fossil fuels, and food security each have become highly politicised
and contentious issues, energy-fuelled conflicts of profound distributional
concern are being managed through processes that depoliticise them. Such
an analysis suggests that collaborative forms of governance serve to repress
the political ecological contradictions of capital, just as was accomplished
through previous regulatory ideologies.
As multi-stakeholder forms of governance continue to proliferate, an ener-
gopolitical lens thus connects seemingly disparate sites of contestation to
53 Erik Swyngedouw, ‘Apocalypse Forever? Post-Political Populism and the Specter of Climate Change’
(2010) 27:2–3 Theory, Culture & Society 213, 225; see also: J Duncan, ‘Governing in a Postpolitical Era:
Civil Society Participation for Improved Food Security Governance’ in David Barling (ed), Advances in
Food Security and Sustainability, vol 1 (Elsevier, 2016).
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larger struggles over carbon extraction, emissions, and consumption. Indeed,
today, multi-stakeholder processes are increasingly proffered as a best practice
for managing ecological conflicts; both the Sustainable Development Goals
and the CFS are promoting multi-stakeholder partnerships.54 While politi-
cal-economic approaches suggest that collaborative processes may reproduce
existing power relations, an energopolitical lens reveals how they are both
constituted by and constitutive of the broader political ecologies responsible
for climate change. For as climate change poses an increasing threat to
global food security, an energopolitical lens connecting larger struggles over
carbon-fuelled climate change is critical.
IV. Conclusions: food, fuel, and the political ecology of
transnational law
Transnational food security governance is an increasingly important site of
study for transnational legal scholars. Struggles over food and agricultural
regulation in the national context have long been constitutive socio-legal pro-
cesses through which new understandings of public and private are con-
structed. As these conflicts are projected into transnational arenas, they
become formative in reshaping relations between state, society, and
markets. Yet the rise of biofuels at a time of increasing concern over fossil
fuel-produced climate change also serves as a reminder of the enduring role
of the food-fuel nexus and provides an impetus to rethink dominant accounts
of power within the law and politics of global food security. Following recent
political ecological analyses of global capitalism, I have argued that under-
standing the food-fuel nexus within larger global processes of energy extrac-
tion, processing, and distribution illuminates the ecological foundation of
contemporary power asymmetries. Drawing on such an approach reveals
how the proliferation of new multi-stakeholder forms to manage the mutually
dependent but contradictory relationship between food and fuel reflects a
larger process of energopolitical transformation.
New forms of multi-stakeholder governance are premised on the assump-
tion that participation and non-hierarchical collaboration can produce new
compromises between competing social, economic, and environmental
values. Indeed, the development of this normative form in response to both
neoliberal welfare state withdrawal as well as new concerns over the global
public good of the environment, is a product of larger energopolitical and pol-
itical-economic transformations. Yet as both my observations of the biofuel
negotiation in the CFS as well as numerous studies of biofuel ‘Roundtables’
54 See SDG #17 (17.16 and 17.17) See: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/
1&Lang=E. In addition, the High Level Panel of Experts of the CFS recently undertook a study of
‘Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships to Finance and Improve Food Security and Nutrition in the Framework
of the 2030 Agenda’. See: http://www.fao.org/3/CA0156EN/CA0156en.pdf.
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suggest,55 these arenas often serve as processes through which powerful
biofuel producing states and multinational corporations seek to legitimise
their economic and energy interests. By framing concerns over food security
and energy security as equivalent values, these processes depoliticise the
tension between food and fuel thereby concealing the ways in which access
to and control over energy serve as the foundation of modern political
power. Analysing transnational food security governance from the vantage
of energopolitics thus suggests that collaborative processes are often them-
selves compromised.
Ultimately, as collaboration becomes the sine-qua-non for sustainability in
an age of climate change, an energopolitical analysis is essential. For as we
enter the new geological epoch known as the Anthropocene, new analytical
tools are needed to integrate nature back into our accounts of how power
operates. Towards this end, energopolitics offers a new conceptual tool for
this analytical programme, for which transnational legal scholars are now
beginning to advocate.56 By connecting disparate sites of conflict, an energo-
political approach illuminates the shifting operation of global power and
moves us towards a greater understanding of the political ecology of transna-
tional law.
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